Search results for "Juicio moral"
showing 4 items of 4 documents
Supervivencia física e integridad moral
2006
Basándose en los testimonios de algunos supervivientes de los campos nazis (Primo Levi, Jean Améry, Bruno Bettelheim), el artículo examina los efectos morales que tuvieron en su vida posterior las condiciones extremas de supervivencia en el campo y plantea la cuestión de la pertinencia del juicio moral en tales situaciones.
Bioethics and neuroethics
2019
Neuroethics officially appeared at the start of the 21st century due to the progress made by the neurosciences, as an applied ethics related to bioethics, but also as an independent discipline in its own right. As an applied ethics, it tackles issues bordering on bioethics. As independent neuroethics, it deals with established philosophical problems from a neuroscientific standpoint in the broader sense. It involves two central questions: the design of a framework in which to select, interpret and integrate data from neuroscience on morality and outlining the appropriate method or methods for this new branch of knowledge. In both cases, most neuroethicists curiously claim to take a naturali…
La radicalidad del mal banal
2002
El concepto de ‘banalidad del mal’ fue introducido por Hannah Arendt a fin de caracterizar una forma inédita de perversidad que ella vio encarnada en Adolf Eichmann y otros criminales nazis. Arendt consideraba que esa forma de perversidad estaba muy alejada de la noción de ‘mal radical’ que Kant había acuñado y la propia Arendt había empleado en trabajos anteriores. El objetivo principal del artículo es mostrar que hay más afinidades entre el mal radical kantiano y la banalidad del mal de lo que la propia Arendt reconoce. ‘Banality of evil’ was a concept introduced by Hannah Arendt in order to characterize a new form of wickedness embodied in people as Adolf Eichmann and others nazis crimin…
Crítica a la naturalización del deontologismo en la teoría del proceso dual del juicio moral de Joshua Greene
2018
In this paper I propose to question the Joshua Greene’s neuroethical thesis about the essentially emotional character of so-called “deontological moral judgments”. Frist, I focus on the dual process theory of moral judgment and I criticize that they are considered only and mainly intuitive and non reflective. Se condly, I question that the “utilitarian judgment” is linked to mathematical calculation and the deontological judgment is exclusively reduced to non-reflective factor of emotion. The main objection to Greene’s naturalism raised by me is trying to eliminate the philosophical justification about the moral validity defended by Kant’s deontologism; meanwhile Greene reduces “deontologic…